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IS THIS THE START OF A SILENT SPRING?
KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON'S EFFECT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL REFORMS
Molly G. Brottmiller+
When the Supreme Court decided Kelo v. City of New London' in June
2005, people from all political persuasions reacted strongly against the
notion that state and local governments could take private property, with
just compensation, for private commercial development.2 On one hand,
liberals feared the ruling would displace people living in blighted areas of
cities,3 while on the other hand, conservatives sought to protect private
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2008, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law. The author thanks Judge Dennis G. Eveleigh and Professor Heather Elliott for
their expert assistance and help with this paper, Kinari Patel for her editing advice, and
Suzanne Eshelman, Jason Derr, and the author's family for their moral support during the
writing process.
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. See John M. Broder, States Curbing Right To Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2006, at Al; Eminent Domain This! Justice's Farm Is Target, MSNBC.com, June
29, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8406056/ [hereinafter Eminent Domain
This.t]. Justice Thomas wrote in his scathing dissent:
The Court relies almost exclusively on this Court's prior cases to derive today's far-
reaching, and dangerous, result. But the principles this Court should employ to dis-
pose of this case are found in the Public Use Clause itself, not in Justice Peckham's
high opinion of reclamation laws. When faced with a clash of constitutional principle
and a line of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the text, history, and structure of
our founding document, we should not hesitate to resolve the tension in favor of the
Constitution's original meaning.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 523 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
3. Supreme Court's Kelo Decision and Potential Congressional Responses: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
27-28 (2005) [hereinafter Kelo Hearing] (statement of Hilary 0. Shelton, Director,
NAACP Washington Bureau). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor warned in her Kelo dissent:
Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the
fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those
citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including
large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now
has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more.
The Founders cannot have intended this perverse result.
Id. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In a comment to a Parade article warning of the
government's increased power concerning takings post-Kelo, a reader wrote:
"Progress" has awakened a sleeping giant. City government made what Camden is
today: a land grab of humbled people and ageless businesses. Rural development ro-
manced middle and upper classes plus big biz out, and now the city wants to shove us
1107
Catholic University Law Review
property interests. One California citizen, Logan Darrow Clements,
even wrote a letter to Justice Souter's hometown of Weare, New Hamp-
shire, suggesting that the town take the Justice's farmhouse (for just
compensation) and use it as a hotel to augment the area's economic earn-
ings.5 Legislatures6 soon followed suit by proposing state legislation that
would specifically limit their states' abilities to take private property un-
der eminent domain.7 Despite the fact that states are never mandated to
aside to attract them back. Officials make tax deals with money-making companies
while squeezing revenue and taxes out of the faithful few left behind. This is called
progress.
Posting of Cortescamden to http://www.parade.com/articles/editions/2006/edition_08-06-
2006/AEminentDomain (Aug. 21,2006, 12:29 EST).
4. Bill Clements, Dispute Underscores Eminent Domain Debate in Minnetonka, ST.
PAUL LEGAL LEDGER, Feb. 13, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 2637253; Broder, supra
note 2; see also Sean Flynn, Will the Government Take Your Home?, PARADE, Aug. 6,
2006, at 6, 6 (warning that because Kelo "made clear that middle-class homes could be
replaced with . . . anything that might increase tax revenue," such as a mall or luxury
homes, "'anyone's home can be taken away from them [and] no one's home is safe'
(quoting Dana Berliner, attorney for the Institute for Justice)); cf Carla T. Main, How
Eminent Domain Ran Amok, POL'Y REv., Oct.-Nov. 2005, available at http://www.hoover.
org/publications/policyreview/2920831.html (arguing that the motive behind economic
development takings is not as some conservatives and liberals believe-"greed and
legislative influence peddling"-rather, "a better description of motive here is the
American lust for land," which emphasizes the importance of land in the United States and
people's relationship with their property).
5. Eminent Domain This!, supra note 2 (explaining that the letter was posted on
conservative radio show host Rush Limbaugh's website). In the letter, Mr. Darrow
explains that, "the justification for such an eminent domain action is that our hotel will
better serve the public interest as it will bring in economic development and higher tax
revenue to Weare." Id.
6. This Comment examines Arizona, California, and Washington because they are
three of the states cited with the most drastic reaction to Kelo. See William Yardley, Anger
Drives Property Rights Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, § 1, at 34 ("The more far-
reaching proposals in the West-in Idaho, Arizona, California and Washington State-are
citizens' initiatives supported by signature petitions, and they are often supported
financially and logistically by national libertarian groups."). This Comment also discusses
Ohio because it is the first state where a state supreme court decided to deal directly with
the Kelo issue. Ian Urbina, Ohio Supreme Court Rejects Taking of Homes for Project,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A18. Urbina explains why the Ohio Supreme Court rejected
the view that a $125 million redevelopment project was a taking for a "public purpose":
The Ohio [Supreme Court] rejected [Kelo], and is part of a broader backlash.
Since the ruling last year, 28 state legislatures have passed new protections against the
use of eminent domain.
"This is the final word in Ohio, and it says something that I think all Americans
feel," said Dana Berliner, a lawyer with the Institute for Justice, a public-interest law
firm in Arlington, Va., who argued on behalf of the homeowners before the Ohio
court. "Ownership of a home is a basic right, regardless of what the U.S. Supreme
Court may have decided."
Id.
7. See H.B. 05-1266, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2005); Assemb. B. 143, 2005 Leg.,
73d Sess. (Nev. 2005); S.B. 326, 2005 Leg., 73d Sess. (Nev. 2005); S.B. 184, 56th Leg., Gen.
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seize property by eminent domain, and such seizures usually occur by
state or local government legislative action,9 state legislatures seem to be
rushing to bind themselves to standards stricter than that demanded by
the Federal Constitution.0
It appears that state legislators initially intended to protect their con-
stituents' private property from being taken for just compensation for
private commercial development; nevertheless, the effect of such legisla-
tion has the potential to be hazardous to environmental restrictions that
use, or would use, eminent domain as a way to preserve natural re-
sources." The Supreme Court's "public use" test to decide when eminent
domain is justifiable 12 has sanctioned environmental justifications for tak-
ing private property.13 However, if states succeed at prohibiting them-
selves from taking private property for any purpose but the narrowest
Sess. (Utah 2005); see also Editorial, The Anti-Kelo Wave, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2006, at A6
(writing about the speed of state legislative action, and commenting that: "These
referendums build on anti-Kelo measures already passed by state legislatures, which aren't
known for moving quickly, much less for exhibiting courage in the face of powerful special
interests (developers, local governments) driving eminent domain abuses. But fear is a
powerful motivator, and voter anger at Kelo has yielded stfiking results. Some 28 states
have already passed statutes that limit 'takings' powers, and five ... ballot measures were
crafted by state legislatures.").
8. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
9. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239 (1984); Strickley v.
Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,
164 U.S. 112, 157-58 (1896).
10. See Broder, supra note 2. Broder comments:
In the New Jersey Legislature, Senator Nia H. Gill, a Democrat from Montclair
who is chairwoman of the Commerce Committee, proposed a bill to outlaw the use of
eminent domain to condemn residential property that is not completely run down to
make room for a redevelopment project. The bill, which is pending, would require
public hearings before any taking of private property to benefit a private project.
Id.
Of course, the insinuation is that a public hearing would show that the public disfavored
private project earnings over their own attachment to their private property.
11. Compare Christopher Cooper, Court's Eminent-Domain Edict Is a Flashpoint on
State Ballots, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2006 at A4, with Allen M. Cary, Letter to the Editor,
The General Kelo Will, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8,2006, at All. Cooper notes:
[I]n the fast-growing West, where building and environmental concerns often pit
government against developers, a different kind of property-rights movement is under
way. Call it Kelo with a twist: Tapping antieminent-domain sentiment that conserva-
tives say runs high among voters, some groups are pushing to limit how governments
regulate private property. Measures heading for ballots in a half-dozen states this fall
would require governments to compensate landowners if they apply more restrictive
zoning retroactively, impose more stringent environmental rules on underdeveloped
property or apply aesthetic-development regulations on private land as a way to
counter urban sprawl.
12. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477-82; Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 164.
13. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984).
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public use purposes,14 states may greatly hamper current and future emi-
nent domain takings for environmental preservation purposes. To pre-
vent this, this Comment proposes three possible courses of action. First,
environmentalists could lobby for mandatory environmental considera-
tions when state or local governments condemn land. Second, although
this may superficially appear to be inconsistent with the first suggestion,
environmentalists could lobby for more extensive and express definitions
of what constitutes a public use to include more environmental concerns
(for example, enumerating parks as acceptable justifications for govern-
ment takings). 6 Finally, environmentalists could act outside the realm of
eminent domain and lobby to pass zoning ordinances that mandate strict
compliance with environmental regulations for the use of any land, in-
cluding land seized by the government and used by private entities. 7
This Comment explores the law on eminent domain that led up to the
Supreme Court's decision in Kelo, which allowed local governments to
take private property for economic development. Next, this Comment
will examine the effect of Kelo on state court rulings and new anti-
eminent domain statutes passed by state legislatures. Third, this Com-
ment will analyze the negative legislative effect on environmental reform
14. See Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 158 (describing the states' interpretation of state takings
clauses, prior to the application of the Fifth Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment, as nonharmonious, with the "inclination of some ... courts being towards a
narrower and more limited definition").
15. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 8.12.030 (West 1992) (providing that eminent
domain is authorized when there is a "purpose of protecting such supply of fresh water
from pollution, and to condemn land and other property and damage the same for such
and for any other public use after just compensation having been first made or paid into
court for the owner in the manner prescribed by this chapter").
16. See, e.g., id. (allowing for government takings for the creation of public parks and
reservoirs, the upkeep of swamps, marshes, tidelands, and tide flats and ponds, and "for
the purpose of protecting such supply of fresh water from pollution"); S.B. 167, 126th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
17. Pima County v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 127 P.3d 64, 65, 67 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2006) (holding that Clear Channel had to remove billboards that were noncompliant with
zoning rules). Specifically, the court noted:
We hold that the state's governmental function exemption from local zoning and
building regulations did not transfer to Clear Channel, which uses the property for
commercial billboards, when the state transferred real property to it as just compensa-
tion in a condemnation action.
... The court in [a previous] case held that "county zoning ordinances cannot over-
ride the state's authority to regulate the use of its own land, whether the activity taking
place on state land is pursued by the state or by a private entity with the state's ap-
proval." Here, however, [the Arizona Department of Transportation] conveyed the
parcels to Clear Channel. As a result, Pima County is not attempting to regulate the
state's use of its own land; rather, the County is attempting to regulate a private en-
tity's use of its privately owned land for private gain.
Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
18. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484-85 (2005).
1110 [Vol. 56:1107
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resulting from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Takings Clause
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution in Kelo.
Fourth, this Comment will scrutinize the various, and often counterintui-
tive, state reactions to the Supreme Court's apparent expansion of state
and local government power. Finally, this Comment argues that envi-
ronmental justifications for takings by state or local governments can
persist if states narrowly limit the definition of "public use" to exclude
economic redevelopment and local governments pass zoning regulations
that provide for environmental protection.
I. FEDERAL AND STATE LAW CONCERNING EMINENT DOMAIN
A. The Supreme Court's Expansion of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause
Although Kelo v. City of New London offers a new, and sometimes
considered radical, take on eminent domain,' 9 courts have been battling
with the meaning of the Takings Clause since 1896.20 In 1896, in Fall-
brook Irrigation District v. Bradley, the Supreme Court applied the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause to the states via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.21 After deciding that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was
not limited to the federal government's taking of private property in re-
turn for "just compensation," the Court turned to the interpretation of
public use.r Unlike the narrow interpretations of public use by state
19. See Broder, supra note 2. Broder states that the decision has "sparked such an
immediate legislative reaction, and one that scrambles the usual partisan lines." Id.
Broder also notes that Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion in Kelo, "all but
apologized" for the decision. Id.; see also Cooper, supra note 11.
20. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-60 (1896). The
plaintiff, Bradley, owned real estate in Fallbrook, San Diego County, California. Id. at
114. Under California law, Matthew Tomlins, collector of the irrigation corporation, was
authorized to sell part of Bradley's land to use for the construction and maintenance of an
irrigation system. Id. The plaintiff brought a suit claiming that the California law was
unconstitutional because it violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 158. The Court
disagreed and held that state and local governments could take private property for public
use in return for just compensation. Id. at 176-78.
21. Id. at 158. The Court explained:
It is claimed, however, that the citizen is deprived of his property without due process
of law, if it be taken by or under state authority for any other than a public use, either
under the guise of taxation or by the assumption of the right of eminent domain. In
that way the question whether private property has been taken for any other than a
public use becomes material in this court, even where the taking is under the author-
ity of the State instead of the Federal government.
Id.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (requiring "just compensation" when private property
is taken for public use); Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 158.
23. Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 159-60.
2007] 1111
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courts prior to Fallbrook,24 the Court reasoned that "[it is obvious...
that what is a public use frequently and largely depends upon the facts
and the circumstances surrounding the particular subject-matter in regard
to which the character of the use is questioned."' Determining that a
California irrigation system that.benefited all who used the water on their
lands was a valid taking under the Fifth Amendment because it was suffi-
ciently intended for use by the public,26 the Court eschewed a literal in-
terpretation of the Takings Clause in favor of a broad interpretation in
27
which a public use could indirectly benefit the public. It was precisely
this notion of a "broader and more natural interpretation of public use as
'public purpose"' that laid the groundwork for Kelo to further expand a
state's power to take private property for public use.29
In 1906, the Court upheld and expanded its Falibrook decision in
Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. to include indirect benefits to
the public in addition to direct benefits in its interpretation of public
user3 In Strickley, the Court decided that an aerial tramway for trans-
porting coal for a private coal company constituted a public use, despite
the fact that the company was privately owned and no passengers could
use the tramway.3' Analogizing the tramway to the constitutionally per-
mitted taking for irrigation systems,32 the Court pointed to "the inade-
quacy of use by the general public as a universal test., 3  By rejectinga
narrow interpretation of public benefit, Strickley expanded Fallbrook's
definition of public use. After Strickley, a public use not only includes ataking that directly helps members of the public, thereby increasing the
24. Id. at 158 (surmising that state court opinions on the matter were "not ...
harmonious" because "the inclination of some of these courts [was] towards a narrower
and more limited definition of such use than those of others").
25. Id. at 159-60.
26. Id. at 162-63.
27. Id. at 163-64. The Court held that not only was the irrigation of arid land in
California a "public purpose" but the water that resulted from the irrigation and the taxes
from the increased property value of the land benefited the public as well. Id. at 164.
28. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,480 (2005).
29. Id. at 484-85.
30. See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906). In this case,
a Utah statute allowed for the government condemnation of land to facilitate private
mining operations. Id. at 530. Holding that the development of Utah's mineral uses
constituted a public use, the Court upheld the taking. Id. at 531.
31. Id. at 529-31. The Court described the taking as a
right of way... [which] is to be used for the erection of certain towers to support the
cables of the line, with a right to drive along the way when necessary for repairs, the
mining company to move the towers as often as reasonably required by the owners of
the claim for using and working the said claim.
Id. at 530.
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general welfare of the whole, but also a taking that confers no direct
benefit upon the public.35 Implicit in the reading of Strickley is the notion
that coal mining, or the "development of [Utah's] mineral resources,"
indirectly serves the general welfare as a source of economic develop-
ment for the State of Utah.36 Strickley, decided nearly one hundred years
before Kelo,37 shares the same holding as Kelo, but on a smaller scale and
particular to Utah's eminent domain statutes.
35. See id. at 530-31. Similarly, before Strickley, the Court in Fallbrook recognized
that the irrigation system increased the value of the property owner's land and thus
benefited the public by increasing the water supply and farming abilities. Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159-60 (1896).
36. The defendant's argument to the Supreme Court in Strickley explained that "[t]he
legislature of Utah has declared the great public necessity of developing the mineral
wealth of the State. The legislature has declared that it is a public use to construct the
aerial tramways for the development of its mineral resources." Strickley, 200 U.S. at 529
(argument for the defendants in error); cf RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 62-63 (5th ed. 1998) ("A good economic argument for eminent domain, although
one with greater application to railroads and other right-of-way companies than to the
government, is that it is necessary to prevent monopoly. Once the railroad or pipeline has
begun to build its line, the cost of abandoning it for an alternative route becomes very
high. Knowing this, people owning land in the path of the advancing line will be tempted
to hold out for a very high price-a price in excess of the opportunity cost of the land....
This is a problem of bilateral monopoly....").
37. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Strickley, 200 U.S. at 527.
38. Compare Strickley, 200 U.S. at 529-31 (noting Utah's eminent domain statute,
which provided that "'the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the
following public uses: . . . (6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes
and dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of ores, or the
working of mines"' (omission in original) (citation omitted)), with Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490
(holding that the city's condemnation of private property for economic development of the
area was within the meaning of "public use" under the Fifth Amendment).
20071 1113
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In 1984, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 9 the Supreme Court
decided that the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) was serving a legiti-
mate public purpose when it sought to limit the number of lots that a pur-
chaser could buy in Hawaii because a concentrated land ownership cre-
ated undesirable economic market conditions 0 Though the Court ex-
39. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Justice O'Connor, who dissented in Kelo, wrote the majority
opinion in Midkiff. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at
231. Justice O'Connor's Midkiff opinion appears in conflict with her dissent in Kelo, in
which she broadly interpreted the ramifications of allowing private development to
constitute a "public use," by warning that "[a]ny property may now be taken for the
benefit of another private party, the fallout from this decision will not be random." Kelo,
545 U.S. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). By contrast, in Midkiff, Justice O'Connor took
a more theoretical position on the issue of what constitued a "public use":
The State of Hawaii has never denied that the Constitution forbids even a compen-
sated taking of property when executed for no reason other than to confer a private
benefit on a particular private party. A purely private taking could not withstand the
scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of gov-
ernment and would thus be void. But no purely private taking is involved in these
cases. The Hawaii Legislature enacted its Land Reform Act not to benefit a particu-
lar class of identifiable individuals but to attack certain perceived evils of concen-
trated property ownership in Hawaii-a legitimate public purpose. Use of the con-
demnation power to achieve this purpose is not irrational.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245. Professor D. Benjamin Barros reflects on this contradiction. D.
Benjamin Barros, Nothing "Errant" About It: The Berman and Midkiff Conference Notes
and How the Supreme Court Got to Kelo with its Eyes Wide Open 2 (Working Paper
Series, 2006), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=902926. Professor Barros notes that his
article
draw[s] on the Court's conference notes and other internal documents in Berman and
Midkiff to contest Justice O'Connor's assertion in her Kelo dissent that "there is a
sense in which this troubling result [in Kelo] follows from errant language in Berman
and Midkiff." The Court's internal deliberations in those cases in fact reveal that the
Court used broad language intentionally (in Berman) and was aware of the risk of
broad language (in Midkiff). Further, the broad language that O'Connor found ob-
jectionable was essential to the Court's holdings in Berman and Midkiff, and the cases
could not have been decided on narrower grounds. Justice O'Connor's suggestion
that broad language in Berman and Midkiff was mere dicta or the result of a judicial
slip of the pen therefore is incorrect.
Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
40. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245. The Court acknowledged and traced Hawaii's problems
with concentrated property ownership by giving a short summary of Hawaii property
ownership history, explaining that:
The Hawaiian Islands were originally settled by Polynesian immigrants from the
western Pacific. These settlers developed an economy around a feudal land tenure
system in which one island high chief, the ali'i nui, controlled the land and assigned it
for development to certain subchiefs. The subchiefs would then reassign the land to
other lower ranking chiefs, who would administer the land and govern the farmers
and other tenants working it. All land was held at the will of the ali'i nui and eventu-
ally had to be returned to his trust. There was no private ownership of land.
Id. at 232 (emphasis added). The Court continued to explain that in the early 1800s, the
federal government owned approximately 49% of Hawaii's land, while another 47% of the
land was privately owned by only seventy-two landowners. Id. at 232. Because of this,
"[t]he legislature concluded that concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing
1114 [Vol. 56:1107
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plicitly stated that "[a] purely private taking could not withstand the scru-
tiny of the public use requirement [because] it would serve no legitimate
purpose of government and would thus be void,'4 1 the Court also implied
that the public use requirement could be fulfilled by something as seem-
ingly abstract as the "perceived evils" that a concentrated real estate
market ' would have on Hawaii's ability to provide more affordable hous-
ing to tenants.43 The Midkiff decision did not say that states could take
the State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public
tranquility and welfare." Id. at 232; see also Main, supra note 4 (advocating political action
in response to economic takings). Main expresses a similar parallel historical view on the
issue of takings:
To understand this, one must consider how deeply ingrained the idea of land is in
the American character. After all, it was land that lured the original colonists to
America's shores. At its inception, America was in essence a great mass of land: a
beckoning, seemingly limitless siren teeming with wild-life and brimming with rich,
arable soil. (The native cultures that inhabited North America were seen by the colo-
nists as obstacles or guides, but not an enticement.)
And all of it safely tucked an ocean away from the anci~n regime of Europe, with
its rigid class structures and feudal limitations on land ownership. "Land hunger
doubtless attacked all landless European emigrants ... coming from countries
wherein economic independence and social status rested on the land. In America,
economic advancement sprang from its easy acquisition. Most colonial fortunes were
founded on it."
As Marion Clawson noted in America's Land and Its Uses, our colonial history was
nearly as long as our history as a nation if one counts the colonial period as beginning
with the settlement of Jamestown in 1607 and ending with the Declaration of Inde-
pendence in 1776. Those 169 years were a hurly-burly land-grab, with the nations of
Europe competing ferociously for territory in the New World.
That crucial century and a half of colonial history set the stage for Americans'
deeply personal and abiding relationship to, and their ongoing obsession with, the
land. Tossing off the shackles of entailment, primogeniture and other vestiges of tra-
ditional European restrictions on land ownership, American colonists during that pe-
riod saw the beginnings of a far more permanent way of owning real property that is
still in predominant use today: fee simple ownership. That is, buy it and keep it-all
of it-including whatever mineral riches may lie within it and whatever air rights may
lie above it. Oh, and your children get to keep it too.
Id. (omission in original).
41. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 232-33. The Court explained the HHA's Land Reform Act:
Under the Act's condemnation scheme, tenants living on single-family residential
lots within developmental tracts at least five acres in size are entitled to ask the Ha-
waii Housing Authority (HHA) to condemn the property on which they live. When
25 eligible tenants, or tenants on half the lots in the tract, whichever is less, file appro-
priate applications, the Act authorizes HHA to hold a public hearing to determine
whether acquisition by the State of all or part of the tract will "effectuate the public
purposes" of the Act. If HHA finds that these public purposes will be served, it is au-
thorized to designate some or all of the lots in the tract for acquisition.
Id. at 233-34 (footnote and citations omitted).
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land for commercial development, as Kelo does;44 nevertheless, it greatly
expanded the traditional interpretation of the Takings Clause to include
economic considerations as a factor in determining whether the state has
41
a legitimate purpose of public use.
B. Taking for Economic Advancement
In 1954, the Supreme Court held in Berman v. Parker that the govern-
ment can take commercial property within "slums" 46 or "blighted areas, 47
for just compensation to redesign the geographic area for new homes,
schools, parks, churches, shopping centers, and streets.48 Specifically, the
Court explained that it was immaterial whether individual pieces of prop-
erty within slums are "innocuous and unoffending, stating instead that
"community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Constitu-
tion, be on a piecemeal basis-lot by lot, building by building."50  Al-
though the Court equated the purpose of the challenged District of Co-
lumbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 to a police power, or the promotion
of the idea that a "community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spa-
44. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485 ("Clearly, there is no basis for exempting economic
development from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.").
45. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
46. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954). The Court defined "slums" as "being
the existence of conditions 'injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare."' Id.
at 31 (quoting Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 724-25 (D.D.C. 1953)).
47. Id. at 28 n.1 (accepting the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act's definition
of "substandard housing conditions" as the "'conditions obtaining in connection with the
existence of any dwelling, or dwellings, or housing accommodations for human beings,
which because of lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, or light, or because of dilapidation,
overcrowding, faulty interior arrangement, or any combination of these factors, is in the
opinion of the Commissioners detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the
inhabitants of the District of Columbia"'(citation omitted)).
48. Id. at 34-35; see also Barros, supra note 39, at 3-4. Barros notes:
Berman's reference to "a better balanced, more attractive community" raises an im-
portant contextual point about Berman that is not abundantly clear from the face of
the Court's opinion. The District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, like many con-
temporaneous redevelopment acts enacted by legislatures around the country, was
not concerned only with clearance of property that was blighted in the traditional
sense of being decrepit and unfit for human habitation. Rather, the Redevelopment
Act also was concerned with using the broader concept of blight clearance to encom-
pass the taking of property "that owing to technological and sociological changes, ob-
solete lay-out, and other factors" might lead to the development of blight. In other
words, the broader concept of redevelopment was concerned not just with slum clear-
ances but with modernization of the urban environment. Both the lower court and
the Supreme Court had the validity of this broader idea of redevelopment squarely in
mind when they considered Berman's challenge the District of Columbia Redevelop-
ment Act.
Id. (footnote omitted).
49. Berman, 348 U.S. at 35.
50. Id. (pointing out that if innocuous property was permitted to remain unchanged,
cities would have difficulties integrating holistic plans for redevelopment).
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cious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled,' the
effect of the decision was a promotion of these objectives through com-
mercial development. By closely examining the holdings in earlier
cases, the Kelo decision does not appear as radical as some commentators
insinuate.53 Rather, Kelo may be interpreted as a more direct restatement
of Berman.4
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,55 a 1984 Supreme Court case, emphasizes
this point. 6 In this case, pesticide manufacturer Monsanto Company
challenged a federal statute that gave the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) authorization to disclose trade secrets Monsanto revealed
when applying to the EPA for a license.57 Monsanto claimed this public
disclosure constituted a government taking. However, the Court stated
that "[s]o long as the taking has a conceivable public character," the gov-
erning body can take the property for just compensation by any means it
chooses. Citing "greater competition among producers of end-use
products," Monsanto reaffirmed both Midkiff and Berman.60
51. Id. at 32-33.
52. See id. at 35.
53. See Broder, supra note 2 (explaining how states are reacting to Kelo). As for the
states, Broder explains:
The reaction from the states was swift and heated. Within weeks of the court's de-
cision, Texas, Alabama and Delaware passed bills by overwhelming bipartisan mar-
gins limiting the right of local governments to seize property and turn it over to pri-
vate developers. Since then, lawmakers in three dozen other states have proposed
similar restrictions and more are on the way, according to experts who track the issue.
Seldom has a Supreme Court decision sparked such an immediate legislative reac-
tion, and one that scrambles the usual partisan lines. Condemnation of the ruling
came from black lawmakers representing distressed urban districts, from suburbanites
and from Western property-rights absolutists who rarely see eye to eye on anything.
Lawmakers from Maine to California have introduced dozens of bills in reaction to
the ruling, most of them saying that government should never seize private homes or
businesses solely to benefit a private developer.
Id.
54. See David Schultz, Economic Development and Eminent Domain After Kelo:
Property Rights and "Public Use" Under State Constitutions, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK
J. 41, 63-64 (2006).
55. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
56. Id. at 1013-14 (holding that trade secrets are property and therefore protectable
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause).
57. Id. at 990, 997-99.
58. Id. at 998-99.
59. Id. at 1014.
60. Id. at 1014-15.
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C. States' Diverging Interpretations of Eminent Domain (Arizona,
California, Washington, and Ohio)
1. Arizona
a. Legislative Interpretation of Eminent Domain
In general, Arizona statutes restrict takings to a greater extent than the
federal government. 6' Although Arizona statutes allow for eminent do-
main for housing developments in "slum" or "blighted areas, 62 the state
63
strictly forbids eminent domain for agricultural purposes and charter
schools.64 In connection with the environment, as of September 18, 2006,
Arizona statutes only refer to eminent domain as a condition that will not
"extinguish[], limit[] or irnpair[]" an environmental restriction. 6  Fur-
thermore, the Arizona Constitution contradicts the Supreme Court's
standard put forth in Monsanto regarding a court's role in interpreting
"public use" by requiring that "[w]henever an attempt is made to take
private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the
contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and deter-
mined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is
public."66
61. Compare ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-183(N) (Supp. 2006) (stating that
"[c]harter schools do not have the authority to acquire property by eminent domain"), with
U.S. CONST. amend. V (no delineation of the governmental agencies that lack the power to
use eminent domain).
62. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1473 (Supp. 2006). In addition, an Arizona
statute provides:
A [p]ublic housing authority may exercise the power of eminent domain. The power
of eminent domain may also be exercised on behalf of a public housing authority.
This power shall only be exercised in relation to the provision of low income housing
pursuant to this article. A public housing authority that acts on behalf of a city, town
or county may exercise the power of eminent domain and may take property title in
the name of that authority if it first obtains the written approval by resolution of the
governing body that controls its acts and existence pursuant to this article.
Id § 36-1407 (2003).
63. Id. § 3-3305 (2002). Contra Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112,
162-65 (1896) (holding that not only was the irrigation of arid land in California a "public
purpose" but the water resulting from that irrigation and the taxes from the increased
property value of the land benefited the public as well).
64. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-183(N) (Supp. 2006) ("Charter schools do not have
the authority to acquire property by eminent domain.").
65. Id. § 49-158(B) (2005).
66. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17. In Monsanto, the Court stated: "The role of the courts
in second-guessing the legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use is extremely
narrow." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984).
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b. Judicial Interpretation of Eminent Domain
On January 25, 2006, the Court of Appeals of Arizona first considered
the application of Kelo in Arizona. 67 In Pima County v. Clear Channel
Outdoor, Inc., the defendant relied on Kelo to support its position that
the term "use" in eminent domain takings extends beyond "physical
use";6' therefore, a new owner of property taken by eminent domain is
entitled to the same exemptions from state zoning laws as state prop-
erty. 69 The Arizona court's reaction to this argument was twofold. First,
the court decided that when a private owner is granted property by emi-
nent domain, the Kelo decision does not play a role at all in determining
how that owner is subject to government regulations. ° Second, although
the court ruled against the defendant concerning its obligation to follow
state regulations,7' it implicitly supported the general holding of Kelo.
The court held that the state is permitted to take private property and
transfer it to another private owner for the purposes of commercial de-
velopment by applying the rules regarding eminent domain to this case,
instead of questioning whether the state's taking of the land was appro-
priate.2 Initially, it may appear that the Arizona state courts accept the
federal interpretation of the Takings Clause; however, because this case
dealt with land that was taken for the generally accepted public use of
widening a public highway,73 this decision may only reflect that Arizona
courts accept the narrow language of the Supreme Court's holding in
Fallbrook,74 rather than the broader holding of Kelo.75
67. See Pima County v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 127 P.3d 64, 66-67 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2006).
68. Id. at 66.
69. Id. at 65-67.
70. Id. at 66-67. The court found that Kelo "did not address whether a private entity
should be exempt from local zoning and building regulations." Id. at 67.
71. Id. at 70 (remanding the case to the trial court "for entry of judgment in favor of
Pima County on the issues of Clear Channel's entitlement to the state's exemption and
collateral estoppel and for further proceedings consistent with this decision").
72. See id. The court described the valid state taking in this case: "Here, Clear
Channel received title to previously condemned land as compensation for the billboards it
was required to remove." Id.
73. Id. at 65.
74. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 174 (1896) (holding that an
irrigation system was a public use that justified the taking of private property).
75. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478-79 (2005) (failing to limit
justifications for takings to traditional public uses such as roads, schools, and irrigation
systems, as in Fallbrook).
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2. California
a. Legislative Interpretation of Eminent Domain
In stark contrast to Arizona, California statutes provide that "eminent
domain is a decision left to the discretion of the person authorized to
acquire the property. ',76 The California Constitution, however, still re-
stricts eminent domain more than what is limited by the Federal Consti-
tution.77 Article I, section 19 of the California Constitution allows private
property to be taken for public use "only when just compensation, ascer-
tained by a jury ... has first been paid to.. . the owner., 78 The provision
never defines public use.79 In 2006, California voters rejected California
proposition 90,' 0 a proposition that would have specifically limited the
definition of "public use" under the California Constitution to exclude
takings for economic development or to enhance tax revenue.81 This
failed proposition limited the definition of "public use," but it never spe-
cifically mentioned environmental preservation.82
b. Judicial Interpretation of Eminent Domain
On April 25, 2006, the California Court of Appeal first cited Kelo.83 In
Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Helliker, Syngenta used pesticides in a
possible violation of California Food and Agricultural Code section
12811.5.' 4 Nevertheless, the issue of eminent domain arose by analogy
regarding the question of "public purpose" sanctioned by the state and
federal governments.8 By citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.86 and
76. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1230.030 (West 1982).
77. Compare CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 19, with U.S. CONST. amend. V (failing to require
a jury determination of "just compensation").
78. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
79. Id.
80. Terry Pristin, Voters Back Limits on Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006,
at C6.
81. Cal. Proposition 90 (2006). The proposition states:
"Public use" shall have a distinct and more narrow meaning than the term "public
purpose"; its limiting effect prohibits takings expected to result in transfers to non-
governmental owners on economic development or tax revenue enhancement
grounds, or for any other actual uses that are not public in fact, even though these
uses may serve otherwise legitimate public purposes.
Id. § 3.
82. See id. § 3.
83. See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Helliker, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 191, 218 (Ct. App.
2006).
84. Id. at 196-98.
85. See id. at 218.
86. 467 U.S. 986, 1014-16 (1984) (holding that the EPA acted with a public purpose
when it used data collected by a prior applicant because it would ultimately save time and
resources for the agency, "making new end-use products available to consumers more
quickly").
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Kelo, the California Court of Appeal aligned with the federal court's
broad interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use. 87 Similar to the
Arizona decision of Pima County v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., Cali-
fornia courts appear to tacitly approve of Kelo.88 It is significant that the
court cited Kelo when the decision could have been based only on the
case's similarity to Monsanto89 because it indicates that the California
Court of Appeal approves of the Kelo decision, at least to the extent of
its definition of "public purpose" as applied to governmental agencies.
Unfortunately, although Syngenta is an environmental case, 90 the issue of
how the court will view environmental justifications for state takings was
not directly addressed. Rather, the court decided on the narrower public
use issue of how the efficiencies of governmental agencies indirectly
benefited the public instead of focusing on the environmental implica-
tions of Syngenta's actions.9'
3. Washington
a. Legislative Interpretation of Eminent Domain
Of the three states discussed above, Washington provides city and state
governments with the broadest powers concerning the taking of private
property for a public use.9' In fact, enjoyment of the environment is spe-
87. See Syngenta, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 218 (citing Kelo as approving of Monsanto's
broad definition of "public purpose").
88. See id.
89. Id. The court indicated that the state agency's actions in this case were
substantially similar to the EPA's action in Monsanto. Id.
90. See id. at 196-98 (discussing the regulation of pesticides containing metalaxyl and
oryzalin).
91. Id. at 218.
92. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.12.030 (West 1992). This provision states:
Every city and town and each unclassified city and town within the state of Wash-
ington, is hereby authorized and empowered to condemn land and property, including
state, county and school lands and property for streets, avenues, alleys, highways,
bridges, approaches, culverts, drains, ditches, public squares, public markets, city and
town halls, jails and other public buildings, and for the opening and widening, widen-
ing and extending, altering and straightening of any street, avenue, alley or highway,
and to damage any land or other property for any such purpose or for the purpose of
making changes in the grade of any street, avenue, alley or highway, or for the con-
struction of slopes or retaining walls for cuts and fills upon real property abutting on
any street, avenue, alley or highway now ordered to be, or such as shall hereafter be
ordered to be opened, extended, altered, straightened or graded, or for the purpose of
draining swamps, marshes, tidelands, tide flats or ponds, or filling the same, within the
limits of such city, and to condemn land or property, or to damage the same, either
within or without the limits of such city for public parks, drives and boulevards, hospi-
tals, pesthouses, drains and sewers, garbage crematories and destructors and dumping
grounds for the destruction, deposit or burial of dead animals, manure, dung, rubbish,
and other offal, and for aqueducts, reservoirs, pumping stations and other structures
for conveying into and through such city a supply of fresh water, and for the purpose
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cifically cited as a reason by which cities are permitted to take private
property for the creation of parks.93 Despite Washington's broad inter-
pretation of "public use," as compared to Arizona's and California's in-
terpretations, the Washington Constitution contains the same provision
as Arizona: "Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a
use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be
really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such, without
regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public." 94 It is less clear
how the public's reaction to the Kelo decision will affect Washington.
b. Judicial Interpretation of Eminent Domain
In Washington, the state's highest court recently approved a municipal-
ity's taking of private land for the future construction of a monorail sys-
tem in HTK Management, L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Authority.95
One of the main issues in this case centered on the length of time the city
would use the land condemned for a public use.9 The court determined
that if the city used the property for a public use for a substantial period
of time (for example, five to ten years), the city would be free to sell the
property later to a private party, instead of returning it to the original
owner.9 At the outset of the opinion, the majority clearly stated that
Kelo was not relevant to the issue at hand because a public monorail was
"an undisputed, historic public use." 98 In dissent, Judge Johnson scath-
of protecting such supply of fresh water from pollution, and to condemn land and
other property and damage the same for such and for any other public use after just
compensation having been first made or paid into court for the owner in the manner
prescribed by this chapter.
Id.
93. Id.; cf. Edward T. McMahon, What Do the U.S. Election Results Mean?, URB.
LAND, Jan. 2007, at 36, available at http://www.uli.org/Content/ContentGroups/
Publications/UrbanLand/2007/JanuaryUL 07 01_McMahon.pdf (connecting government
acquisition of land for parks to a public interest in land conservation).
94. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 16.
95. See HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 121 P.3d 1166, 1168
(Wash. 2005).
96. Id. at 1177. The court noted:
In this case, for the first 5-10 years, a substantial portion of the property will be put to
public use and only after that time is there a possibility that the property may be sold.
Furthermore, the record indicates that in other cities that constructed public monorail
transportation systems, surrounding land may need to be owned permanently by the
condemning authority due to the particular traffic pattern of monorail stations.
Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1168 n.1. The court noted:
Contrary to the dissent's view, the facts and legal issues in this case bear no resem-
blance to the recent decision in the United States Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of
New London. In Kelo, the City of New London condemned property in order to de-
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ingly criticized the majority opinion, stating, "the majority of this court is
less enlightened than the citizenry or less inclined to restrain public agen-
cies in their taking of private property. I side with the citizens and our
Washington Constitution. I therefore dissent." 99 It appears that although
the Washington Constitution's provision on eminent domain, passed long
before the Supreme Court decided Kelo,1°° is one of the more conserva-
tive provisions in the country' (and is almost as conservative as Califor-
nia's failed proposition 90 or Arizona's statutory provisions), Washington
is perhaps insulated from a conservative backlash against Kelo. In Seattle
Popular Monorail Authority, the Supreme Court of Washington stated
that it would not interpret eminent domain more narrowly as a result of
the Supreme Court's Kelo decision.'02
4. Ohio
a. Legislative Interpretation of Eminent Domain
Ohio is distinct from the other states analyzed in this Comment (Ari-
zona, California, and Washington). Since Kelo, Ohio has passed a mora-
torium on any takings for economic development until December 31,
2006.10 Furthermore, this moratorium states that a taking for economic
development directly violates sections 1 and 19 of Article I of the Ohio
Constitution,' 4 thereby protecting "the rights of Ohio citizens to maintain
property as inviolate. By stating that the moratorium will endure until
velop a certain area of the city, which included the condemnation of property in order
to build a private hotel and new private residences to be owned by new homeowners.
Id. (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 1180 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Judge Johnson also referred to Kelo as an
example of federal "eminent domain abuse." Id.
100. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
101. See Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 121 P.3d at 1180 (Johnson, J., dissenting)
("[L]egal scholars and citizens exulted that Washingtonians were insulated from such
abuse because the plain language of the Washington Constitution ... afforded broader
protection against eminent domain abuse than its federal counterpart.").
102. Id. (majority opinion).
103. See S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
104. Id. The text of Article 1, section 19 of the Ohio Constitution provides:
Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.
When taken in time of war or other public exigency, imperatively requiring its imme-
diate seizure or for the purpose of making or repairing roads, which shall be open to
the public, without charge, a compensation shall be made to the owner, in money, and
in all other cases, where private property shall be taken for public use, a compensa-
tion therefor shall first be made in money, or first secured by a deposit of money; and
such compensation shall be assessed by a jury, without deduction for benefits to any
property of the owner.
OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 19.
105. Ohio S.B. 167. According to the moratorium:
The General Assembly hereby makes the following statements of findings and intent:
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appropriate "legislative remedies may be considered,"' 16 the legislators
are provided more time to consider the ramifications of Kelo. Compared
to Arizona, California, and Washington, Ohio manifests the clearest in-
tent not only to limit the courts from interpreting the Ohio Constitution
in a manner similar to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Takings
Clause, but also to buttress public opinion on the matter.'O°
b. Judicial Interpretation of Eminent Domain
Ohio is unique in that it passed a moratorium in reaction to Kelo, as
opposed to simply retaining the ability to interpret state constitutions or
codes as inconsistent with Kelo's holding.'9 Likewise, Ohio's courts have
directly addressed the validity of takings for private economic develop-
ment.' 9 In City of Norwood v. Horney,"0 decided on July 26, 2006, the
Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously held that takings that transfer
property to a private party for economic "redevelopment" are inconsis-
tent with Article I, section 19 of the Ohio Constitution, and, therefore,
are an inappropriate use of governmental power."' Although this deci-
sion is certainly the most direct rejection of Kelo compared to any other• • 112
recent state decision, the holding is narrow."3  Norwood only limits
economic redevelopment takings; the decision does not limit the defini-
(A) On June 23, 2005, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Kelo v. City of New London, which allows the taking of private property that is not
within a blighted area by eminent domain for the purpose of economic development
even when the ultimate result of the taking is ownership of the property being vested
in another private person. As a result of this decision, the General Assembly believes
the interpretation and use of the state's eminent domain law could be expanded to al-
low the taking of private property that is not within a blighted area, ultimately result-
ing in ownership of that property being vested in another private person in violation
of Sections 1 and 19 of Article I, Ohio Constitution, which protect the rights of Ohio
citizens to maintain property as inviolate, subservient only to the public welfare.
Thus, the General Assembly finds it is necessary to enact a moratorium on any tak-




107. Correy E. Stephenson, Ohio Supreme Court Decision Limits Eminent Domain
Power, DAILY REC. (Kansas City, Mo.), Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/
p/articles/mi-qn4181/is_20060818/ai_n16669200.
108. See Ohio S.B. 167.
109. See City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1122 (Ohio 2006).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1123.
112. See Stephenson, supra note 107 (quoting land use attorney Michael M. Berger as
saying that the Norwood case "'was the post-Kelo development to date'... 'And it was as
anti-Kelo as it could be."').
113. Id. (quoting Professor James Durham as stating that the City of Norwood decision
is actually "very narrow").
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tion of what is considered to be a public use.114 Therefore, although Ohio
may be at the center of the "political firestorm of Kelo,'.. 5 environmental
takings are not mentioned directly or indirectly.
II. ANALYSIS OF KELO'S EFFECT ON STATE LAW
A. Is Kelo Truly a Radical Precedent?
When Kelo was decided, both conservatives and liberals treated the de-
cision as if it were unprecedented . Conservatives asserted their right to
private property."7 Liberals' fears were two-fold: first, that Kelo may
permit local governments to displace the poor and middle class in favor
of business or commercial growth; and, second, that an overzealous anti-
Kelo reaction would undo reforms intended to protect the environ-
ment. However, the reality is different: the Supreme Court has been
slowly expanding the definition of a justifiable "public use" for govern-
ment takings. 9
The Kelo case arose when Susette Kelo and eight other plaintiffs re-
fused to sell their homes in New London, Connecticut.20 The city of New
London found that Kelo's neighborhood of Fort Trumbull, though not
blighted, was at a great economic disadvantage to the rest of New Lon-
don.'2 In 1996, the federal government decided to close the Naval Un-
dersea Warfare Center in Fort Trumbull.' The center had employed
over 1500 people, and just two years after the closing, unemployment
114. City of Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1152.
115. Stephenson, supra note 107 (quoting the city of Norwood's attorney Timothy
Burke as saying that "'the political firestorm of Kelo did significant damage to the city of
Norwood"').
116. See Clements, supra note 4; Flynn, supra note 4; Posting of Cortescamden, supra
note 3.
117. See Clements, supra note 4; Cooper, supra note 11.
118. Kelo Hearing, supra note 3, at 27-28 (statement of Hilary 0. Shelton, Director,
NAACP Washington Bureau); cf Broder, supra note 2 ("'It's fair to say that many states
are on the verge of seriously overreacting to the Kelo decision,' said John D. Echeverria,
executive director of the Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute and an
authority on land-use policy. 'The danger is that some legislators are going to attempt to
destroy what is a significant and sometimes painful but essential government power. The
extremist position is a prescription for economic decline for many metropolitan areas
around the county."').
119. See Derek Werner, Note, The Public Use Clause, Common Sense and Takings, 10
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 335, 341-46 (2001) (chronicling the history of the Supreme Court's
"public use" doctrine jurisprudence). In addition, David R. Burch argues that "under the
[Midkifj] Court's analysis, "it will be the truly rare taking that will not be for a public use."
David R. Burch et al., Land Use Controls: Public Use and Private Beneficiaries, 16 URB.
LAW. 713,714 (1984).
120. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,475 (2005).
121. Id. at 473.
122. Id.
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rates were nearly double the state's rate.'2' To prevent the deterioration
of Fort Trumbull, the municipal government "reactivated" a previously
created private nonprofit organization, the New London Development
Center (NLDC), to target Fort Trumbull in an economic revitalization
plan. The NLDC planned to lease the land to private entities, some of
which would build research and office space, and others that would use
adjoining parcels of land for an urban village (including restaurants,
shopping, and marinas), a pedestrian riverwalk, and eighty new private
homes.' 2' In short, the local government would condemn private prop-
erty, the property owners would receive due compensation, and the land
would be transferred to other private entities with the purpose of eco-
nomically revitalizing the area.'26 Nevertheless, nine homeowners in the
Fort Trumbull area refused to sell their property, and in 2000, they
brought an action against New London alleging wrongful taking of their
land for private use.
The Supreme Court ruled that although there was no contention that
the petitioner's property was blighted,1'2 the taking was nonetheless
valid. 12 Because the NLDC's plan would indirectly benefit the citizens of
New London by raising the socioeconomic level of the city, the taking of
private land satisfied the "public use" requirement set forth in Fallbrook
even though private parties directly benefited. 130
The Kelo opinion is not a departure from precedent. In 1896, Fall-
brook held that a California irrigation system that only directly benefited
farmers was a justified taking for "public use.' 131 Ten years later, in 1906,
Strickley held that private land could be condemned so that a private
mining company could build a nonpassenger aerial tramway for mining
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 473-74. The NLDC had been created several years earlier to help the city
with economic development. Id.
126. Id. at 472.
127. Id. at 475.
128. Id.; see also supra note 46 (noting the Berman Court's definition of "slums").
129. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
130. Id. at 478-79. The Court explained its application of rational basis review, instead
of petitioner's suggested "reasonable certainty" test as follows:
Alternatively, petitioners maintain that for takings of this kind we should require a
"reasonable certainty" that the expected public benefits will actually accrue. Such a
rule, however, would represent an even greater departure from our precedent.
"When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our
cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than de-
bates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be car-
ried out by the federal courts."
Id. at 487-88 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984)); see also
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 164 (1896) (holding that irrigation
system qualifies as a "public purpose" under the Fifth Amendment).
131. See Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 159-60.
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operations because mining indirectly benefited the State of Utah.132
Then, in 1954, the Supreme Court decided in Berman that the govern-
ment, under the public use justification, could seize well-maintained,
profit-producing, and otherwise innocuous property within a "blighted"
area for community development. 13  In 1984, Monsanto reaffirmed the
broadening of the "public use" justification as long as the government
had any "conceivable public character."' Most recently, in the 1984
Midkiff decision, the Supreme Court laid the final groundwork for Kelo
by holding that a state could justify a taking to eliminate the "perceived
evils" that a concentrated real estate market could have on the State of
Hawaii.13 For over one hundred years, the Supreme Court has approved
of state measures to condemn private property for the eventual, indirect,
economic, and holistic benefit of the state through the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause.36 Kelo is not radical; it is the logical outgrowth of fed-
eral precedent.
B. State Legislation Limiting Eminent Domain and Its Potential Effect on
Environmental Takings
Although Kelo is not a radical decision in terms of precedent, the state
reaction to Kelo has been described as a "political firestorm."' 37 The
trend in restrictive state legislation is to explicitly forbid state or local
takings for commercial development, not to enumerate acceptable public
uses. 138 Ohio, the state that most drastically reacted to Kelo, did not act
quickly to define and limit eminent domain. 139 Rather, the Ohio legisla-
ture passed legislation that forbade governmental takings while the state
and local legislatures took the time to carefully draft an appropriate way
132. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527,531 (1906).
133. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954); see also Barros, supra note 39, at 3-4.
134. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984).
135. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
136. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
137. See Stephenson, supra note 107; see also Editorial, supra note 7 (commenting on
the effect of Kelo on the 2006 congressional election: "There isn't much doubt, however,
about another kind of electoral wave that has been building across America and is set to
crash on Tuesday. That tsunami is the property-rights backlash, which is the direct result
of last year's misguided and deeply unpopular Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of
New London. A narrow Court majority decided that the Constitution's 'takings' clause
somehow allowed the government to seize private property not merely for 'public use' but
also on behalf of other private interests.").
138. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1407 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.12.030
(West 1992).
139. Stephenson, supra note 107 ("Ohio was one of 28 states that passed legislation
after Kelo, but the statute didn't make substantive changes. It established a moratorium
on the use of eminent domain and created a task force to study the issue. A report from
the task force was due [August 1, 2006]."). Stephenson's article was published seventeen
days after August 1, 2006. Id.
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to protect private property without causing a host of unintended prob-
lems and litigation.
Furthermore, many state statutes and constitutions have specific provi-
sions that allow government takings for the creation of parks or recrea-
tion areas that are open to the general public. For example, the Ohio
moratorium on eminent domain lists public parks as an approved "public
14 142
use. ' 14 Washington has a similar provision. Although not all environ-
mental reforms are in the form of public parks, the general exception is
indicative that these states are likely to find that environmental conserva-
tion or general environmental concerns constitute "public uses" if chal-
lenged.1 4 ' Along the same lines, both Arizona and Washington cite com-
pliance with environmental regulations or reforms as reasons to either
restrict eminent domain or justify a government taking.144 Therefore,
because Ohio, Washington, and Arizona do not specifically prohibit envi-
ronmental justifications for "public uses" as they do for commercial de-
velopment justifications, and some form of environmental precaution is
mentioned in connection with eminent domain, environmental reforms
are neither the targets nor the incidental victims of eminent domain re-
strictions.
Compared to the other states discussed in this Comment, California
seems to offer the least protection for environmental restrictions related
to eminent domain.' 6 However, this conclusion may not be an accurate
comparison because California's provisions concerning eminent domain
are noticeably shorter than any of the other states. 47 This brevity may
not indicate a reluctance of California to consider environmental goals as
"public uses"; rather, it may display that California views the debate on
eminent domain in a more limited manner.
140. S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
141. Id.
142. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.12.030.
143. Washington's statute specifically allows for government takings for the creation of
public parks and reservoirs, the upkeep of swamps, marshes, tidelands, and tide flats and
ponds, and "for the purpose of protecting such supply of fresh water from pollution." Id.
144. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-158 (2005) ("If notice of the declaration of
environmental use restriction that includes a specific description of the area of the
property that is subject to the declaration of environmental use restriction is contained in
the repository maintained by the department pursuant to § 49-152, subsection E, a
declaration of environmental use restriction may not be extinguished, limited or impaired
through... [the e]xercise of eminent domain."); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 8.12.030.
145. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
146. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (making no mention of the environment or anything
tangentially related to the environment).
147. Compare ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17, with CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
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C. Do State Courts' Decisions Interpreting "Public Use" Curtail
Environmental Takings?
Although the possibility of new restrictions on eminent domain by state
legislation is still lurking, the general trend appears to address the issue in
a narrower way than first anticipated by journalists interviewing citizens
and politicians shortly after Kelo was decided.148 State courts also appear
to be following this trend, 49 which is more significant based on the idea of
legal precedent. For example, although Arizona, California, and Ohio
have state provisions, either in propositions, statutes, or state constitu-
tions, which limit the effect Kelo can have on eminent domain, each of
these state courts have cited some aspect of Kelo as valid precedent
within the state.' In Arizona, the court cited Kelo to show that although
Arizona does not consider economic development a public use, the court
left the door open as to whether Kelo still establishes that the term "use"
when referring to government takings means more than the literal defini-
tion of "physical use."'' Similarly, in California, the court accepted the
broad Kelo definition of "public purpose" as it refers to government
agency action, but did not reflect on the difference between "public pur-
pose" and the term "public use" found in the California Constitution.
5 2
Ohio, by contrast, offered a direct rejection to Kelo's expansion of "pub-
lic use" to encompass economic redevelopment.'53 Nevertheless, the
Ohio Supreme Court only rejected the economic redevelopment aspect
of Kelo and not the entire holding.14 Therefore, the Ohio court may be
indicating its tacit approval of a generalized expansion of eminent do-
main, though not to the extent of the federal interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause.
Washington is the only state of the four discussed in this Comment that
has not directly discussed Kelo within its state courts. The majority in-
148. E.g., Broder, supra note 2 (noting that some states were close to overreacting to
Kelo).
149. See Pima County v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 127 P.3d 64, 66-67 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2006); Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Helliker, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 191, 218 (Ct. App.
2006); HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 121 P.3d 1166, 1175 (Wash.
2005).
150. See Pima County, 127 P.3d at 66-67; Syngenta, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 218; Seattle
Popular Monorail Auth., 121 P.3d at 1175.
151. Pima County, 127 P.3d at 66-67. The court noted that "[a]t oral argument, Clear
Channel also relied on Kelo v. City of New London... to support its contention that the
state's 'use' of property ... is not limited to physical 'use."' Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
However, the court did not agree with Clear Channel's assertion. Id. at 66-67.
152. See Syngenta, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 218.
153. City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1123, 1140-42 (Ohio 2006).
154. Stephenson, supra note 107.
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sisted that Kelo was irrelevant in Seattle Popular Monorail Authority."
Judge Johnson, the dissenting judge in Seattle Popular Monorail Author-
ity, interpreted Kelo as a "denial of federal constitutional protections
against eminent domain abuse," while also acknowledging the "state's
power to afford their citizens greater protection., 15 6 Judge Johnson took
issue with the holding in Kelo, and argued that Seattle Popular Monorail
Authority was the court's opportunity to distinguish the Washington Con-
stitution from that of the federal government.1 17 The court's refusal to
apply Kelo, or even acknowledge its pertinence to this decision is signifi-
cant. It shows that the Washington Supreme Court is not taking this op-
portunity to follow Kelo's suggestion that states interpret "public use"
under their own constitutions narrowly. Although Washington may later
restrict its interpretation of public use under its own constitution, in this
instance, it refrained from doing so. Therefore, perhaps Washington will
be insulated against an anti-Kelo "political firestorm"'' 8 present in other
states.
III. KELO's IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS
Currently, state legislatures and courts are resisting completely redefin-
ing the concept of eminent domain in a way that is unique to their state. 9
Instead, states relied on statutes that expressly prohibit the condemnation
of private land for economic development 60 Although this change dif-
fers greatly from over one hundred years of interpretation of the federal
Takings Clause, T6 it will not necessarily have a great impact on environ-
mental legislation, reforms, and takings. The states discussed in this
155. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 121 P.3d at 1168 n.1 ("Contrary to the dissent's
view, the facts and legal issues in this case bear no resemblance to the recent decision in
the United States Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London." (citation omitted)).
156. Id. at 1180 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. Stephenson, supra note 107.
159. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17 (delegating the role of determining what constitutes
a "public use" to the judiciary, regardless of a purported legislative intent); CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 19 ("Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just
compensation ... has first been paid to .. . the owner."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
8.12.030 (West 1992) (authorizing a broad list of acceptable eminent domain takings,
including for environmental reasons); see also Pima County v. Clear Channel Outdoor,
Inc., 127 P.3d 64, 68 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (applying the rules governing a taking for
commercial development); Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Helliker, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 191, 218
(Ct. App. 2006) (following Kelo implicitly by applying the Kelo-approved Monsanto
definition of "public use"); City of Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1140-42 (holding that
economic benefit cannot by itself satisfy the public use requirement for a constitutional
taking); Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 121 P.3d at 1180 (implying that Washington would
not more narrowly interpret acceptable eminent domain takings as a result of Kelo).
160. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.12.030.
161. See supra Part I.A.-B.
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Comment have limited their statutory or constitutional changes to the
state concept of eminent domain with regard to economic development.
62
As discussed above, in addition to citing environmental concerns as a
reason to find that a taking does not serve an adequate public purpose,
some states include provisions that directly authorize state and local gov-
ernments to take private property for just compensation for the creation
of public parks. This generally encouraging attitude toward environ-
mental protection amidst the anti-Kelo firestorm of conservative legisla-
tion indicates that states will not actually carry out the once-discussed
reactionary eminent domain reforms presented just after Kelo was de-
cided.'64 Furthermore, in each state discussed in this Comment, the state
courts had an opportunity to wholly reject Kelo as applicable to that
state's takings clause. 61 Nevertheless, only one court, the Supreme Court
of Ohio, directly rejected Kelo.'66 Still, that rejection was limited to
Kelo's holding on economic development, and not necessarily the Su-
preme Court's expansion of the "public use" justification for government
takings.' 67
A. What Can Environmentalists Do to Protect Environmental Takings?
Currently, environmental reforms are not in imminent danger of being
invalidated because they conflict with state takings clauses;M however,
Kelo clearly acknowledged that states were free to restrict their interpre-
tation of state eminent domain. 69 In effect, Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority in Kelo, encouraged disgruntled states to limit their own
162. See supra Part I.C.
163. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.12.030.
164. See supra Part I. Contra Broder, supra note 2.
165. See supra Part I.C; see e.g., Pima County v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 127 P.3d
64, 66-67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (avoiding judicial interpretation of Kelo in a case
concerning the granting of land to a private entity for the purpose of commercial
development); Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Helliker, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 191, 218 (Ct. App.
2006); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1123 (Ohio 2006); HTK Mgmt.,
L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 121 P.3d 1166, 1168 n.1 (Wash. 2005) (refraining
from interpreting the impact of Kelo because the court found that the facts in Kelo bore no
resemblance to the issues in Seattle Popular Monorail Authority).
166. City of Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1141-42.
167. Id. at 1135; see also Stephenson, supra note 107.
168. See supra Part II.B-C.
169. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) ("In affirming the City's
authority to take petitioners' properties, we do not minimize the hardship that
condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the payment of just compensation. We
emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions
on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose 'public use'
requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these requirements have
been established as a matter of state constitutional law, while others are expressed in state
eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings may be
exercised." (footnotes omitted)).
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power to condemn land for public use.1 70 Although states have not thus
far been successful at binding their legislatures and courts to a pre-1896
definition of "public use" or "public purpose," '71 future legislation could
potentially have an adverse impact on environmental reform.7
In order to guard against such a situation, environmentalists could con-
tinue to promote environmental reform in the following manner. First, as
evidenced by the Washington eminent domain statute, environmentalists
could lobby for mandatory environmental considerations when state or
local governments condemn land.' If the taking of the land would ad-
versely affect the environment in a substantial way, the taking could be
deemed inconsistent with the state notion of public use. This way, envi-
ronmentalists could oppose economic development when it substantially
interferes with concrete environmental goals, but still guard against the
conservative "anti-Kelo" backlash that John M. Broder warns of in his
New York Times article, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes.7
Second, environmentalists could lobby for more extensive and express
definitions of what constitutes a valid public use to include more envi-
ronmental concerns. Although many statutes list public parks as an ex-
ample of a valid use of the government taking power,'175 environmentalists
could lobby to expand this list of definitions beyond uses that directly
confer a benefit upon the public. For example, state statutes could list
preservation of wildlife, anti-pollution measures, and restoration of for-
ests as valid state exercises of eminent domain.
Finally, environmentalists could lobby to create more extensive zoning
ordinances to protect environmental concerns. The Court of Appeals of
Arizona decided that a private entity that receives previously condemned
land from the government is subject to the same zoning ordinances as
land that was obtained in any other fashion.17 Therefore, if the zoning
regulations are strict in terms of environmental protections, the purpose
of a government taking will not be permitted to be carried out if it con-
flicts with the regulations. This, in turn, may encourage state courts to
170. See id.
171. See generally Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Helliker, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 191, 214 (Ct.
App. 2006); City of Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1132-33.
172. Cf. Cooper, supra note 11.
173. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.12.030 (West 1992) (providing that eminent domain
is authorized to "protect[] such supply of fresh water from pollution, and to condemn land
and other property and damage the same for such and for any other public use after just
compensation having been first made or paid into court for the owner").
174. See Broder, supra note 2.
175. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.12.030; S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 2005).
176. Pima County v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 127 P.3d 64, 68 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2006).
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permit more environmentally friendly government takings by setting a
more concrete standard for deciding what serves a public purpose.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Kelo decision, which interpreted the federal Takings Clause to
permit a local government to take private land for the exclusive use by
private entities using the property as part of an economic development
plan, was based on Supreme Court precedent that dates back to 1896.
When the decision was first announced, both conservatives and liberals
proposed new legislation that would drastically reduce a state or local
government's power to seize land under the concept of eminent domain.
The current reality, however, reflects a much more limited state reaction.
State statutes and constitutional provisions mostly restrict only the "eco-
nomic development outside blighted areas" element of the Kelo decision,
rather than the entire doctrine of government taking for general or even
indirect public use. Currently, environmental reforms do not appear to
be threatened because state limitations on eminent domain either (1) do
not directly preclude environmental concerns from constituting a public
use, or (2) list general environmentally friendly approved takings that
could be analogized to expand the accepted environmental takings under
the definition of public use. Although states thus far have not succeeded
at drastically limiting governmental power to condemn private property,
those concerned for the future ramifications of environmental reforms as
they relate to a restricted definition of eminent domain could take several
precautions. Environmentalists could lobby state and municipal legisla-
tures to include specific examples of acceptable eminent domain takings
that serve environmental protection purposes in proposed legislation.
Environmentalists could also lobby the legislatures for further mandatory
environmental considerations when determining when a taking benefits
the public. And finally, environmentalists could support the passage of
strict zoning ordinances that forbid using land taken by eminent domain
in a manner detrimental to the environment.
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